An unexpected contact on the professional network. An offer of work from a headhunter, probably a female agent, based in China. The opportunity to make around £20,000 part-time writing a small number of political reports for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged insights. Payment in digital currency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this method would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to use headhunters to try it – prompting the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their activity online.
Massive Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were approaching Britons on LinkedIn on an unprecedented level, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, attempting to obtain governmental, commercial, defense and technological secrets. However a fresh initiative aimed at politicians and parliament has led the spy agency to take further action.
A spying alert was distributed on this week via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, peers, their staffers, economic experts, research organizations – anyone who might become a source.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Changes
In the curious style of UK security services, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. Yet the service was aware its advisory document would leak once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the media helps the wider public better identify communications with a deceptive purpose.
This warning has the impact of flushing out additional details from within Westminster, though that is not the agency's main objective. The agency wants people in public life to understand that simply because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, although the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing collapse of the prosecution of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate another person on a legal detail in recent months.
Both individuals had been charged of working for China – a allegation they denied – but failure to complete a trial under the now repealed previous legislation resulted in concerns that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Laws and China's Strategic Goals
The law has since been updated, and the security briefing contains a reminder of its replacement: “Those engaging in espionage activity face substantial legal consequences under the National Security Act.” This constitutes a criminal offense if somebody engages in behavior that could potentially “materially assist a overseas spy agency”.
An obvious question, though, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of sensitive information, and an associate of theirs even less. But Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a time, in recent years, the UK’s approach to China on matters such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export information gathering methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, engaging three hundred thousand individuals. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, commented it was sometimes estimated that “China have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is willing to develop people over the long term and sometimes even the agencies have found it difficult to distinguish between genuine connections and spying. “Beijing has a minimal requirement for what information is deemed to be useful,” the minister responsible a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a rapid shift in the political cycle may mean an individual rapidly marginal turning important.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between China and the west at a threshold below the level of direct conflict. China has stepped up its cyber operations, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Chinese authorities is involved in persistent efforts to identify covert sources on UK politics online because it wants to be provocative, to display influence and because it has the capability.
